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The People's Republic of Albania:
Shall We Now Enter An Era Of
Negotiation With It After
Twenty-five Years Of Confrontationt?
Introduction -How Present Sino-Albanian Ties
Relate to the United States
The People's Republic of Albania is strategically located, and rugged yet
vulnerable. Its great importance to world peace! despite its small size is best
reflected in the graphic sentence contained in a telegram dated September
17, 1968 from Communist Party Chairman Mao, Communist Party
Vice-Chairman Lin Piao and Premier Chou En-lai, addressed to Albanian
Labor Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and the Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu, which appeared high on the front page of
Peking's official Chinese-language daily, Renmin Ribao:
If the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet modern revisionists and their running
dogs dare touch a hair on the head of Albania, nothing but complete, igno-
minious and irrevocable defeat awaits them.
Those prone to discount such a lopsided Asian-European military link,
as at the most merely symbolic, should ponder the message published in
the official English-language weekly Peking Review, No. 29, July 16, 197 1,
alongside the Hsinhua News Agency dispatch, announcing that Premier
Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for
National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 1I, 197 1.
That message, dated July 9, was from the Minister of National Defense of
the People's Republic of China to the Vice-Chairman of the Council of
Ministers and Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of Albania, on
the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian
People's Army, and concluded:
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Let us, the Chinese and Albanian peoples, unite with the people through-
out the world and strive jointly to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their
running dogs completely!
A Review of United States Recognition Policies
Toward Albanian Governments: 1921- 1971
Since December 1921, the United States Government has continually
been faced with appraisals and reappraisals of various Albanian govern-
ments, in order to determine the feasibility as well as the timing of accord-
ing de jure recognition after considering conditions in that country, the
stability of those in authority, existing or prospective American interests
there, and whether or not other nations had arranged to accord de jure
recognition.
United States conduct towards Albanian Governments, in according and
in withholding de jure recognition between World War I and 11, as well as
during and after World War II, can with the benefit of hindsight provide us
with useful clues as to what approach to try in 1972 with respect to the
People's Republic of Albania. The instances investigated and reviewed
below in considerable detail, are believed to hold the key in charting our
future policy in the direction of recognition.
Prewar (1922) Recognition
In July 1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes completed swift
action to recognize an Albanian government, in the light of warnings
received in April 1922 from Ambassador Richard W. Child at the
American Embassy in Rome. He had expressed fear that American in-
terests in Albania would be harmed, should other countries gain early
ascendancy there. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in Washington,
had reached the same conclusion after talking with a representative of the
Sinclair Oil Company negotiating for an Albanian oil concession. Am-
bassador Child had concluded:
It is quite possible that if skillfully handled some definite benefit could
accrue to American interests through the promise of recognition and the
timely culmination of the event.
Secretary Hoover, in his letter dated April 26, 1922 to Secretary
Hughes, had pointed to recognition of the Albanian Government by Eng-
land and Italy, and then asked him "to give serious consideration to the
recognition of Albania." By the time (May 22, 1922) Hughes had answered
Hoover's letter, help for American interests was on its way in the person of
Consul General Blake, formerly Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at
Tangier. On Blake's recommendation of the "propriety and expediency of
immediately according American recognition of Albania," based on the
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commitments in writing favoring American commercial interests made by
Albanian Prime Minister Djafer Ypi under date of June 25, 1922, Hughes
telegraphed Blake on July 25 that he could extend United States de jure
recognition on July 28, 1922.
Prewar (1924) Non-Recognition
A new Albanian government seeking United States de jure recognition
between June and December 1924, met with American inaction and was
overthrown. Within a week of the public announcement in mid-June of the
composition of the Albanian Government headed by Prime Minister Fan
Noli, American Minister in Albania, Grant-Smith, had received the Prime
Minister, who pleaded for recognition by the United States. The American
Minister informed his visitor that American policy in Europe regarding
recognition was one of "avoiding the impression of hasty actions." He then
reminded Noli that the prior Albanian regime "had failed to fulfill its
promises as to equality of opportunity" and had not yet brought to justice
those responsible for the murder of two Americans in Albania on April 6,
1924.
Secretary of State Hughes did no more than authorize Minister
Grant-Smith to continue at his discretion to carry on relations with the
then present Albanian Government; action constituting dejure recognition
on the part of the United States Government was not taken. On October
10, 1924 the American Charg6 d'affairs in Tirana reported that the Noli
Government was as weak as ever and the Prime Minister remained abroad.
He concluded:
I do not believe that it will serve American interests to take up formal
relations at present with the Nationalist regime, in view of all the facts and
considering that Greece is the only nation represented here which is not
reserving recognition for a more favorable time.
On December 25, 1924 Minister Grant-Smith telegraphed the Secretary of
State that the Albanian revolution had succeeded, Ahmet Zogu having
entered Tirana that morning.
Prewar (1925) Recognition
Following the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly on January 15,
1925 for the purpose of regularizing the new regime, which appeared to
American Minister Grant-Smith to be "relatively stable," a Republic was
proclaimed on January 2 1. Ahmet Zogu became its President. In a tele-
gram dated January 22, 1925, Secretary of State Hughes said: "There is
nothing to be gained by indefinitely withholding recognition." Never-
theless, he requested certain assurances from President Ahmet Zogu, that
more vigorous action would be taken with respect to those Albanians
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responsible for killing American citizens Coleman and De Long on April 6,
1924. American Minister Grant-Smith obtained such assurances. Informed
of this January 30, Secretary of State Hughes on January 31 cabled
Minister Grant-Smith authorization "to extend recognition to the new
regime in Albania and to acknowledge the receipt of official notification of
establishment of the republic." This was done under date of February 2,
1925.
Within a year the new American Minister in Albania, Charles C. Hart,
could report that, by virtue of a unanimous vote of both houses of the
Albanian Parliament:
Engagements made by the Albanian state as the conditions upon which
recognition was granted by the American Government on July 28, 1922, have
at last been removed from the field of controversy....
After the measure passed unanimously by parliament on December 14 was
signed December 21 by President of the Republic Ahmet Zogu, equal
commercial opportunity for the United States became part of the law of
Albania on December 28, 1925, the statute taking effect on that day with
its publication in the Official Gazette.
Events Preceding Wartime (1944) Non-Recognition
of the Hoxha Government Formed at Berat
The Albanian Government of former President Ahmet Zogu, on Sep-
tember I, 1928 proclaimed His Majesty Zogu 1, King of the Albanians. He
was of the illustrious Albanian family of Zogu, and thereafter ruled in
accordance with the Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom of Albania, but
his government disintegrated following the occupation of Albania by Italian
troops in April 1939. King Zogu eventually received admission to England.
The United States Government never formally terminated its relations
with King Zogu, but instructions were given to American Minister Hugh
G. Grant to leave Albania, and the Albanian Legation in Washington was
closed late in the spring of 1939. The United States Government never
recognized the subsequent annexation of Albania by the Italian crown, and
it refused to recognize the puppet government established in Albania by
Italy; moreover, from 1942 to 1944 it publicly sought to encourage Alba-
nian resistance and unity.
In a widely disseminated "Statement by the Secretary of State," re-
leased to the press on December 10, 1942 (and published in the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin December 12, 1942) a call for self-government was
issued within the context of the restoration of a free Albania, as envisaged
in the joint declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Church-
ill, made on August 14, 1941 and known as the "Atlantic Charter." A
sequel termed "Statement by the Department of State" was released to the
722 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
press April 6, 1944 (and published in the Department of State Bulletin
April 8, 1944). It expressed pleasure that the Albanian struggle for free-
dom had not been abandoned after the fall of Prime Minister Benito
Mussolini in 1943, and the commencement of the Nazi German occupation
of Albania.
The first formal step toward Albanian unification within Albania took
place in Permet, a small town in southern Albania not far from the Greek
frontier, even before Allied Forces had entered Rome. The First
Anti-Fascist National Liberation Congress, adopted in Permet on May 24,
1944, a lengthy "Declaration" in which Secretary of State Cordell Hull's
Statement, and similar ones also released in December 1942, by British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden and by Vyacheslav
Molotov's People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, were referred to in a
preambular paragraph as constituting solemn recognition of Albania's right
to independence. There followed a paragraph ascribing exceptional impor-
tance to this First Anti-Fascist National Liberation Congress, because it
would create an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council as the Albanian
people's "supreme legislative and executive organ," which would in turn
create an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Committee as the "chief execu-
tive organ, with the attributes of a provisional government."
The formal decision of the Permet Congress to elect such a Council, and
to empower it to form such a Committee, came on May 27. Thereupon this
Council, on May 27, issued a six-point decree, providing for this Com-
mittee "having all the attributes of a provisional people's government."
Later that day this Council issued three more decrees. One of the three
named Enver Hoxha Commander in Chief of the Partisan Volunteer Na-
tional Liberation Army and bestowed upon him the rank of Colonel Gener-
al. This decree took on added significance due to the fact that the Permet
Congress had indicated, as the eighth point of its formal decision of May
27, the desire of the Congress that both the Soviet Union and the United
States of America send military missions to be attached to the PVNLA's
General Staff. Of possible interest, but little importance, was the fact that
all these Permet decrees dated May 27 or 28, 1944 bore the signature of
the Secretary of the Anit-Fascist National Liberation Council, Kogo Tash-
ko, who had attended Harvard University in 1921.
The Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Albania, by virtue of
its decree dated October 22, 1944, issued in the city of Berat, was trans-
formed into a "Democratic Government of Albania." The adjective
"provisional" rendered both as "prkohishme" and "provizore" in the
Permet Congress declaration of May 24, and the AFNL Council decrees
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of Permet dated May 27-28, did not appear once in the AFNL Council
decree of October 22. Colonel General Enver Hoxha gained additional
stature under this Berat decree, being designated Prime Minister as well as
Minister for War and for National Defense.
The ostensible domination of this new "Democratic Government of
Albania" by a man reputed to be one of the leaders of the Communist
Party of Albania founded in Tirana on November 8, 1941, could not help
but worry Prime Minister Churchill. His British Government already faced
"confusion and disaster" in Greece, England's old ally, due in large part to
lack of firmness exhibited under what Churchill so expressively described
as "the general principle of slithering to the left." By November 3, 1944 it
had been decided, not surprisingly, that "In the present confused situation
in Albania, His Majesty's Government do not propose to recognize the
Provisional Government," i.e., the Hoxha Government. On November 21,
1944, the Department of State concurred in this decision, explaining:
The Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government
that any request for recognition of the provisional government formed at
Berat which may be received at this time should not be granted. The Depart-
ment feels, however, that there may be a stage in the not distant future in
which it may be found expedient to consider the desirability on practical
grounds of establishing with such governing authority as may be in de facto
control of the country such relations as would enable this Government to
open an office in Tirana for the purpose of protecting American interests
there and coordinating the activities of the representatives of other American
agencies who may be sent to Albania. The Department will be disposed to
give sympathetic consideration to a request for de jure recognition by an
Albanian Government only at such time as it may be able to demonstrate that
it is non-Fascist in character, that it has established its authority over the
country, that it represents the will of the people and is prepared to fulfil its
international obligations.
Preliminary (1945) Concerted Allied Steps toward
Recognition of the Hoxha Government
By the time (January 12, 1945) the British Government had expressed
complete agreement with the American position taken in the Department
of State Memorandum of November 21, 1944, both British and American
de jure recognition of Hoxha's Albanian Government had been rendered
more complicated. Colonel General Enver Hoxha, as "Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania," had on
December 21, 1944, sent a personal letter appealing for recognition of his
Government to President Roosevelt.
Letters with an identical text were addressed to Prime Minister Chur-
chill and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Marshal Stalin.
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This tripartite appeal was repeated by publication of the text on the front
page of the January 4, 1945 issue of Tirana's leading newspaper Bashkimi
(The Union), Organ of the General Committee of the National Liberation
Front. In his letter to President Roosevelt, written in French, Enver
Hoxha termed the events at Permet and Berat the crowning achievements
in Albania's five-year struggle for national liberation and then declared:
Aujourd'hui notre pays 6tant liber6, le Gouvernement D1mocratique est le
seul Gouvernement qui repr~sente I'Albanie chez nous comme t I'6tranger.
En Albanie comme i '6tranger personne ne peut contester le fait de
I'existence de notre gouvernement. L'autorit6 de notre gouvernement s'6tend
sur toutes les regions du pays, sur tout le peuple albanais.
In conclusion, Enver Hoxha sought recognition by Albania's three
Great Allies:
Pour garder et consolider les rapports d'amiti6 contracts dans la lutte
commune contre le fascisme, pour consolider la collaboration entre l'Albanie
et les Grands Allies, j'ai I'honneur de Vous presenter l'expression de la
volont6 du peuple Albanais ce que son gouvernement soit reconnu en
premier lieu de la part de nos Grands Allies Anglo-Sovieto-Americains et
d'6tablir des relations diplomatiques entre Votre gouvernement et le notre.
The official seal of the Council of Ministers appeared over the edge of the
signature of Enver Hoxha.
As we discover from a Memorandum dated March 17, 1945 in the
Department of State's Division of European Affairs, of which Cavendish
W. Cannon was the drafter, Enver Hoxha's letter "came to the attention of
the President only after his return from the Crimea Conference," which
took place February 4- II, 1945. Meanwhile, the Department of State had
under active consideration, a plan to send to Albania an informal and
unofficial survey mission to determine when and under what conditions
American representatives might be officially established in Tirana. Acting
Secretary of State Joseph Grew had this plan outlined in a memorandum
dated January 26, 1945 in mind when cabling instructions on January 31 to
the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theater, Caserta, Italy.
The Colonel General was to be told: (I) his request for recognition
addressed to Roosevelt had been received in Washington, but the Depart-
ment of State planned no formal reply: (2) the United States Government,
before according recognition to any Albanian Government, would have to
be more fully informed than at present regarding the situation in Albania.
According to the aforementioned Cannon Memorandum dated March 17,
President Roosevelt had indicated he would like to speak to the Secretary
of State about the question of recognition of the present Albanian Govern-
ment, but on the recommendation of the Division of European Affairs, the
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discussion had been postponed until a report could be received on the
progress made to conduct a preliminary survey of conditions in Albania.
Shortly thereafter, on March 19, a telegram was sent to Caserta over the
signature of Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, providing the text of a
memorandum to be prepared for delivery to Colonel General Hoxha with
respect to his request for recognition. In essence it stated that the United
States Government wished to become more fully informed regarding condi-
tions and developments in Albania, and proposed to send into Albania a
small group on an informal basis to obtain the necessary information upon
which to base any official recognition. Any delay in working out some such
arrangement would only delay the decision on official recognition by the
United States Government sought by Colonel General Hoxha. The memo-
randum prepared in Caserta long these lines was delivered to Colonel
General Hoxha on March 23, and, although he commented adversely on
the fact that it was unsigned, the next day he sent a note in reply accepting
the proposed mission for the purpose of "facilitating the recognition of our
Democratic Government."
By April 7, 1945 detailed instructions from Secretary of State Stettinius
had been prepared for Foreign Service Officer Joseph E. Jacobs, who had
been chosen to head the mission. A major policy consideration was out-
lined:
It is our view that no one of the three principal Allied Governments should
take any decisive action with regard to Albania on matters of international
importance, such as recognition, boundaries, federation, alliances, et cetera,
except in consultation with the other two Allied Governments.
Jacobs was instructed as to when he should make an informal call on
Colonel General Enver Hoxha, and how he should conduct himself during
that call:
You should leave no doubt in his mind that your presence is not to be in
any way construed as representing any degree of recognition whatever and
that the carrying out of your mission is a prerequisite to this Government's
consideration of the question of establishing official relations, whether de
facto or de jure with the existing Albanian authorities.
In accordance with these instructions, after his arrival in Tirana on May
8, 1945 with a party of eight comprising the unofficial American survey
mission, Jacobs called on Colonel General Hoxha, Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania. In a telegram
reporting on this call of May 9, he commented:
Hoxha strikes me as a forceful character with ambitions but suffering from
effects of an inferiority complex because of his failure to win recognition.
Six days later, after acquainting himself with the findings of Brigadier D. E.
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P. Hodgson, Commander of the British Military Mission to Albania, Ja-
cobs reported:
Finally I feel that unless present regime falls before my report is submitted
which seems highly unlikely continued failure of the United States and Great
Britian to recognize will drive it completely into Yugo-Slavia-Soviet fold.
Jacobs filed a preliminary summary of the findings of his survey mission
on July I, 1945, and sent a summary report incorporating final recommen-
dations on August 15, 1945. His principal recommendation in each in-
stance was to the effect that recognition should be accorded the present
authorities on condition that they undertake to hold elections of a free and
democratic nature subject to international supervision in accordance with a
joint British-Soviet-American formula; simultaneous recognition by the
three Allied Governments would follow as soon as possible. At sessions of
the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in October 1945, with Jacobs
present to assist, arrangements were made for concerted tripartite notifica-
tion of expeditious recognition of the Hoxha Government. In this con-
nection, the French Government was requested to postpone its recogni-
tion of the Hoxha Government until the British-Soviet-American notifica-
tion had taken place.
The Tripartite Notification of Recognition,
Tirana, November 10-12, 1945
Concerted Allied action on recognition of the Hoxha Government ap-
peared probable and imminent from Washington's viewpoint by the close
of business November 8, 1945. That afternoon two telegrams were sent to
Tirana to Acting Representative in Albania Harry T. Fultz. The first
provided him with the text of the United States note on recognition for
Colonel General Enver Hoxha; the second informed him that British and
Soviet representatives in Tirana had been instructed by their respective
Governments to communicate notes on recognition to Hoxha on Novem-
ber 10, and instructed him to deliver the note of the United States Govern-
ment on that day.
On the morning of November 10, Fultz, who had received the second
telegram but not the first, was compelled to improvise. Brigadier Hodgson,
Fultz's British counterpart in the proposed tripartite notification procedure,
informed him that Soviet representative Colonel Sokolov had already
called on Hoxha at 8:00 a.m.- it was not known whether he had done so by
instruction or on his own initiative. Fultz then arranged to accompany
Hodgson to his meeting with Hoxha, which took place at 11:00 a.m. At
that meeting Fultz handed Hoxha an informal note mentioning the con-
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certed tripartite notification procedure and then explaining that the United
States note on recognition had been delayed in transmission but would be
delivered to Hoxha immediately upon receipt; the note would be released
to the press in Washington on November 10 as scheduled, however.
Colonel General Hoxha finally received the text of the United States
note, delivered by Fultz, on November 12 at 11:30 a.m. By then the
Anglo-American team had been placed in an awkward position in the
Albanian press. A special one-page edition of Bashkimi on November 10
contained only the unconditional Soviet note signed by Colonel Sokolov,
Head of the Soviet Military Mission, and Anglo-American notes of recog-
nition were reported to have been delayed in transit. When Bashkimi's
regular four-page edition appeared November I1, separate treatment was
given to the British and American notes on recognition, bringing more loss
of face to the United States. The process was culminated November 17
when Bashkimi printed side by side the British note on recognition contain-
ing one condition and the American note setting forth two.
The Belated United States Note on Recognition
The pertinent paragraphs of the United States note released to the press
November 10 (and published in the Department of State Bulletin Novem-
ber !I,. 1945), were candid and unambiguous:
The Government of the United States, having considered the request of
the Albanian authorities for recognition, has instructed me to inform you of
its readiness to enter into diplomatic relations with the existing regime in
Albania as the provisional Government of Albania.
In establishing official relations with an Albanian Government, the United
States Government desires to act in conformity with the obligations and
principles to which it subscribed in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated
Europe and accordingly requests assurances that the forthcoming elections
for a Constituent Assembly shall be held on a genuinely free basis, with
secret ballot and without threats or intimidation; that all democratic in-
dividuals and groups in Albania shall enjoy freedom of speech and the right
lawfully to present and support their candidates; and that foreign press
correspondents shall be permitted to enter Albania to observe and report
freely on the elections and the work of the Constituent Assembly.
The Government of the United States also desires that the Albanian
authorities shall confirm that the treaties and agreements which were in force
between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939, remain valid. The
United States Government, on its part, confirms the continuing validity of
these instruments.
Upon receipt of the assurances requested, the Government of the United
States will be prepared to proceed with the exchange of diplomatic represen-
tatives.
I have also been directed to advise you that the present proposal of the
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United States Government with regard to the establishment of diplomatic
relations should not be construed as prejudicing consideration, at a later date,
of other questions of an international character involving Albania.
I shall be most happy to transmit to my Government your reply to the
proposals set forth above.
Mutual Accommodation (November 15, 1945) on the
Legal Issue Involved in Recognition
The official Albanian reply of November 15 to Mr. Fultz for trans-
mission to the United States Government, contained one paragraph de-
voted to the subject of the continuing validity of Albanian-American
treaties and agreements, which read in this writer's translation from the
original Albanian text:
As for any treaties or agreements which have been entered into between
Albania and the United States previous to April 7, 1939, we refer to our
letter of November 13, 1945, in which we have requested that we be sent
copies of these treaty instruments in order that we may look into them
because the majority of the archives of the Foreign Ministry of Albania were
burned or stolen by the invaders. However, we hope that this will not cause
any delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries,
so that our Government can quickly take into consideration all the agree-
ments that may exist between the two states.
The last part of the original Albanian text is very misleading, for it
meanders like a stream from "treaties" (traktateve) to "agreements" (mare-
veshjet), and from "countries" (vendeve) to "states" (shteteve). Faced with
perhaps a deliberately misleading text, the mission staff translated it in a
manner which tended to raise false hopes of Albanian accomodation. This
translation, which had the approval of Albanian-speaking Harry T. Fultz,
the Action American Representative in Albania, was sent to Washington in
dispatch No. 120 dated November 22, 1945. The final Albanian sentence
had been split in half, the final Albanian clause rendered in English as:
In this way our government will take over all the agreements which may
exist between the two states.
The key verb to be translated here is a compound one appearing in the
original Albanian test as "mard shpejt ne shqyrtim," which means literally
"take quickly into consideration." Having rendered these four words as
"will take over," Acting Representative Fultz was committed to an overly
optimistic interpretation of the note dated November 15, 1945, signed by
Colonel General Enver Hoxha as Prime Minister of Albania:
In paragraph five, the final sentence of which reads, 'in this way our
government will take over all the agreements which may exist between the
two states', General Hoxha is apparently stating that his government in
general will respect treaties previously entered into by the two countries but
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seeks the privilege first of knowing specifically to what past governments
have committed the country. This position does not seem to diverge greatly
from the proposal made by the Department in its telegram no. 109, referred
to above.
As a matter of fact, the Department's telegram No. 109 sent to Tirana
November 15 may well have evoked the optimistic interpretation from
Fultz, because it reflect genuine anxiety about facilitating recognition of
Hoxha's Government:
Please inform Gen Hoxha that in view of destruction of Albania State
archives and time required for copies of treaties to reach Tirana US Govt is
willing, provided Albanian authorities will affirm established principle of
international law respecting continuing validity of treaties entered into by
former Govts and not legally terminated, to proceed with establishment of
diplomatic relations upon receipt of assurances concerning free elections.
You should add, however, that in accepting temporary postponement of reply
by Albanian authorities confirming validity of specific treaties which were in
force between US and Albania on April 7, 1939, this Govt will expect to
receive assurances regarding status of these instruments as soon as possible
after copies of them are made available in Tirana.
Enver Hoxha Cites a Legal Bar to Assurances
Sought by the United States
This United States Government offer to accept from Albania authorities
in lieu of confirmation mere affirmation, pending subsequent examination of
specific treaty texts, of the established principles of international law
concerning the continuing validity of treaties entered into by previous
Governments and not legally terminated, was transmitted November 17 to
Colonel General Enver Hoxha. In his reply dated November 23, Hoxha
cited a provision of Albanian law which, he contended, barred assurances
by Albanian authorities of the continuing validity of such Alba-
nian-American legal instruments.
The provision cited can be found on pages 4 and 5 of the Official
Gazette (Gazeta Zyrtare), No. 1, December 21, 1944, published by the
Democratic Government of Albania's Ministry of Press, Propaganda and
People's Culture. The provision is actually the second of three operative
sections of a decree issued May 27, 1944 in Permet, by the First Session of
the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council, which this issue of the
Official Gazette identified in its Table of Contents as: "Decree of the
AFNL Council on Forbidding the Return of Zogu to Albania-No. 3."
Major excerpts from this official text are set forth below in this author's
translation:
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of the First Session of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council on
Forbidding the Return of Zogu to Ablania before Total Liberation of Our
Country
... Considering the destruction of the country's economy and the placement
of Albania in a completely vassal-like position economically by concluding
economic treaties with Fascist Italy,
... Considering the betrayal of the Fatherland through contriving Italian
Fascism's domination of Albania by importation of military organizers and
organizers of youth and via concessions granted to various Italian corpo-
rations,
... The Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council, expressing the will of the
Albanian people, has decreed:
1.
That the entry of Zogu into Albania is forbidden until the regime it will
have has been decided by the people after total liberation of our country.
II.
That all agreements, economic and political, concluded with foreign states
be reviewed and those made by the Zogu government which are damaging to
the Albanian people be breached and replaced by new ones.
Ill.
That not one agreement and not one international commitment be accepted
which was made outside or within Albania by reactionary cliques, whether
acting as a political group or as a government.
CHAIRMAN
Dr. Omer Nishani [signature]
SECRETARY
Kogo Tashko [signature]
An Analysis and Critique of Colonel General Hoxha's
Legal Citation of November 23, 1945
Before undertaking an analysis and critique of Hoxha's legal citation, it
is appropriate to quote a paragraph providing general coverage of this
decree which appeared in an official, authoritative publication issued in
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Tirana in 1969, and widely circulated in the English-speaking coun-
tries -Answers to Questions about Albania:
The Congress of Permet decided that the question of Albania's r6gime be
settled immediately after the country's liberation, but it prohibited the return
of King Zogu to Albania and it did not recognize any other government
formed, inside the country or abroad, against the will of the Albanian people.
The Congress voted to reconsider all political and economic agreements
entered into by previous governments, especially by that of Zogu, and to
annul all those that jeopardized the sovereignty of the people or the economic
interests of the country.
In view of the wording of my translation above and the general state-
ment of an authoritative character made twenty-five years after the action
taken in Permet in May 1944, it is submitted that in explaining to Jacobs in
mid-December 1945 "that all treaties and agreements of former r6gimes
must be abrogated and new treaties negotiated" Hoxha tended to exagger-
ate the scope and effect of this May 27 decree, at least of section 11, which
was the sole legal provision cited by Hoxha, and probably did so to give
the United States Government the impression that his hands were tied by
it.
It is also submitted that Hoxha may have given on November 23, 1945
an imprecise citation of a legal provision and an unjustifiably harsh in-
terpretation thereof deliberately, because he was then ignorant of the
particular treaties and agreements the United States had in mind. Accord-
ing to Jacobs, who had returned to Tirana on November 29 after a long
absence, Hoxha did not know what instruments were actually involved
until November 30, 1945:
He expressed keen disappointment that US had made affirmation of former
treaties condition precedent to recognition, especially as British Government
had not done so. He said that members regime were extremely suspicious of
all treaties negotiated by former Albanian Government; so much so that mere
word treaty had become in minds of Albanians a symbol of the sale or gift of
Albania's birthright to foreign powers. Until I handed him yesterday (in-
formally pending receipt of certified copies from Department) copies of the
four treaties (arbitration, conciliation, extradition and naturalization) he and
his r6gime did not even know what treaties existed between US and Albania.
It is further submitted that Hoxha needed a legal bar to assurances
sought by the United States because his Government was then concerned
about whether France would accord it unconditional recognition regardless
of the outcome of the dispute over the continuing validity of the prewar
treaties and agreements. According to a telegram from Jacobs dated De-
cember 18, 1945:
Hoxha makes much of fact that British and Soviet recognition without
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commitments regarding treaties (knowing that Soviet has none) and that
acceptance either our alternatives may lead to complications with France
which on basis commitment with US might seek to revive concessionaire
treaties.
Shortly thereafter, on December 2 1, 1945, the French Government's deci-
sion to recognize unconditionally the Albanian Government of Colonel
General Hoxha was communicated to Minister of Foreign Affairs Omer
Nishani through the Chief of the French Military Mission, who received a
greatful note dated December 22, 1945 in reply.
Finally, it is submitted that not only Colonel General Hoxha but also
Mr. Harry T. Fultz, the Acting Representative of Albania in the absence of
Mr. Jacobs, had a mistaken idea of what precisely was done at Permet in
May 1944. In a despatch to Washington dated November 24, 1945 Fultz
explained:
The laws referred to as enacted in Permeti May 25, 1944, I believe, are in
fact resolutions adopted at the time. We do not have available a copy of the
decision taken at Permeti but suggest that a translated version of this should
be available in OSS files, should you find it desirable to check this.
From the explanation provided one may conclude that with respect to
vital decisions taken at Permet the American mission was unable to dis-
tinuish between actions taken there (on May 24 a Declaration and on May
27-28 eight decrees), and had not thought of checking those actions in the
only authoritative Albanian source-the Official Gazette.
Albanian-American Relations Start to Deteriorate
(January-March 1946)
Eventually, on January 16, 1946, certified copies of all treaties and
agreements in effect between the United States and Albania on April 7,
1939 were delivered to Colonel General Hoxha. By then the status of the
unofficial survey mission headed by Foreign Service Officer Jacobs had
markedly deteriorated from the previous year. Its activities were being
effectively circumscribed, and it was subjected to such discourtesy on the
part of the controlling authorities that closing the mission had become a
possibility.
The change in the relationship of the American survey mission to the
Hoxha Government was reflected in developments in January 1946 with
respect to that Government. After elections to the Constituent Assembly
had been successfully held on December 2, 1945, the newly elected Con-
stituent Assembly convened on January 10. The following day it pro-
claimed Albania a "People's Republic," officially dissolved the Zogu
monarchy, and acted "to approve all laws and decisions of the Anti-Fascist
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National Liberation Council, and its executive organ, from the Congress of
Permet to the day when the Constituent Assembly was convened."
Meanwhile, the question of assurances requested by the United States
Government concerning the status of treaties and agreements in effect
between the two countries on April 7, 1939, became linked more closely
with frantic efforts by the new People's Republic of Albania to obtain
membership in the United Nations. Despite its efforts, assumption of a
responsible place for the People's Republic of Albania within the postwar
family of nations seemed to depend upon affirmation of the continuing
validity of such prewar treaties and agreements. Rebuffed in its efforts to
gain sufficient support to overcome direct and indirect Anglo-American
resistance to membership for the People's Republic of Albania in the
United Nations, the Albanian Government in general, and Colonel Gener-
al Hoxha in particular, simply ignored the suggestion of long standing made
to Hoxha in a note from the United States Government delivered Decem-
ber I, 1945.
This was unfortunate, because the suggestion was the most sensible one
made by the United States in the entire controversy and should have been
advanced earlier. The suggestion was that should American-Albanian
agreements or provisions thereof require, according to the Albanian au-
thorities, modification, suspension pending conclusion of new agreements,
or termination due to changed circumstances or other legitimate reasons,
then the United States Government was convinced that such steps should
be taken by common accord, resulting from negotiation following appro-
priate prior notification rather than by unilateral repudiation.
On February 27, 1946 Jacobs was told by Hoxha that the Albanian
Government's position remained unchanged-any reexamination of exist-
ing prewar treaties and agreements must follow United States recognition
and the arrival in Tirana of an American Minister.
American Support (April-August 1946)for Greece's
Territorial Claims Angers Hoxha
During the spring and summer of 1946, one major issue plaguing Ameri-
can relations with the People's Republic of Albania, was the manner in
which the United States Government supported Greek Government
Claims to "Northern Epirus" (Southern Albania). These claims were
raised primarily at the Paris Peace Conference, where provisions of the
Treaty of Peace with Italy were being hammered out.
On April 12, 1946, Colonel General Hoxha. sought an official ex-
planation from the United States Government for a resolution (S. Res. 82)
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introduced by Senator Claude Pepper which, on March 27, 1946, had been
reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably and
without amendment:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including
Corytsa) and the twelve islands of the Aegean Sea, known as the Dodecanese
Islands, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded
by the peace conference to Greece and become incorporated in the territory
of Greece.
The reply to Hoxha was in the form of a Memorandum sent out on May
1I, 1946 over the signature of Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
The Memorandum concluded that Senate action on S. Res. 82 should not
be construed as indicating the attitude of the United States Government's
Executive Branch as to its merits, pro or con.
In the Senate passage of S. Res. 82 came on July 29, 1946 after a short
debate in which misconceptions about geography on the part of a number
of Senators were on exhibition. However, it was the follow-up action on
August 30 at the Paris Peace Conference which angered Hoxha. The
United States vote then in favor of placing the issue of Greek territorial
claims to Northern Epirus on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference,
was denounced by Hoxha in the presence of Jacobs on more than one
occasion, although it was a vote not on the substance of the matter but one
of procedure. Both Prime Minister Hoxha and Greek Prime Minister
Tsaldaris had made statements at the Paris Peace Conference in late
August, concerning draft provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy in the
context of relations between Albania and Greece.
Hoxha's Compromise Offer (August 13, 1946) on
Existing A lbanian-A merican Instruments
On August 13, 1946, five days before departing for Paris to become
Head of the Albanian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Prime
Minister Hoxha submitted what was to be his Government's final offer on
the subject of the continuing validity of treaties and agreements in effect
between Albania and the United States on April 7, 1939. As reported by
Jacobs (articles being omitted for brevity's sake) Hoxha had presented the
compromise offer in these terms:
Government of the Republic of Albania having always in mind friendship
based on mutual respect for international and national rights as link between
our two countries, as well as similar relationships with all other democratic
and progressive countries, most sincerely and patiently accepts validity of
treaties of international character which existed between our two countries as
listed below: (here Department should insert titles of eleven multilateral
treaties copies of which Department submitted to Albania authorities through
this Mission in January).
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With respect to other treaties of bilateral character as listed below: treaties
of arbitration, conciliation, naturalization and extradition the Albanian Gov-
ernment is ready to take them under consideration immediately with Ameri-
can Minister who will come to Tirana after our government is recognized.
After necessary corrections have been made by two parties these treaties will
enter into force at once.
Then, comparing this cable text of Hoxha's letter dated August 13 with
Hoxha's oral comments on that day on this subject, Jacobs noted astutely:
Letter reiterates substance what Hoxha said, mentioning eleven multilater-
al and four bilateral treaties, but contained no reference to nature desired
corrections and does not mention passport fees agreement, money order
convention and, what is far more important, most-favored-nation treatment,
exchange of notes beginning 1922 and completed 1925 which Hoxha did not
mention orally.
Hoxha's letter, equivocal as usual and with the emphasis upon treaties
rather than agreements, and upon multilateral treaties rather than bilateral
ones, went unanswered. Hoxha, obviously impatient, took the opportunity
of discussing his compromise offer in public among his supporters on
October 7, 1946, when he addressed the General Council of the Democrat-
ic Front. According to the text provided by the newspaper Bashkimi the
following day, Hoxha began the presentation of his case by railing against
the series of nefarious treaties concluded by the Zogu Government, and by
praising the Albanian people's delegates gathered at Permet in May 1944
for rejecting those treaties.
Besides impatience, another reason for this show of displeasure with the
United States on the part of Hoxha, may have been his anger over the
forthcoming departure of Jacobs, whose farewell call on the Prime Minister
took place on October 9. Whether or not Hoxha knew that Jacobs had
become head of the American survey mission with the understanding that
if de jure recognition was ever accorded to the Hoxha Government, he
would be the new American Minister, Hoxha must have surmised that,
with the departure of Jacobs, such recognition was no longer envisaged.
Withdrawal of the American Survey Mission in
November 1946
Almost a month before Prime Minister Hoxha delivered his major politi-
cal address, Secretary of'State James F. Byrnes had reached the con-
clusion that United States de jure recognition of the People's Republic of
Albania had become completely undesirable. He embodied his conclusion
in a telegram dated September 20, 1946:
I wish that no steps be taken toward recognition of the r6gime in Albania
at this time. Regardless of what Albania may do to accept the validity of our
treaties, any recognition extended at this time would be widely mis-
interpreted.
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On November 2 the decision to withdraw the entire mission was com-
municated to Tirana and, on November 5, an informal note was delivered
to Hoxha acknowledging that "the Mission has been unable to achieve the
purposes for which it was originally sent to Albania." Prime Minister
Hoxha quickly placed his interpretation on this new development, in-
corporating it in a lengthy note delivered to the American mission on
November 7 and published in Bashkimi on November 12, in which he
lauded the compromise offer made August 13 and criticized the impolite
Americans for their failure to respond. Meanwhile, the United States
Government presented its side of the matter in dispute, setting forth the
history of the mission and the rationale for its withdrawal in a State
Department press release of November 8 (published under the title "Amer-
ican Mission to Albania Withdrawn" in the Department of State Bulletin
November 17, 1946), which read in part:
The proposal made by the United States Government on November 10,
1945, to recognize the Albanian regime headed by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha
specified as a condition that the Albanian authorities affirm the continuing
validity of all treaties and agreements in force between the United States and
Albania as of April 7, 1939, the date of the Italian invasion of Albania. The
requirement of such an assurance from the Albanian regime as a prerequisite
to United States recognition is in accord with the established practice of this
Government to extend recognition only to [hose Governments which have
expressed willingness to fulfil their international obligations. The Albanian
regime on August 13, 1946, after a delay of nine months, indicated its
acceptance of the multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the
United States and Albania are parties, but it has failed to affirm its recogni-
tion of the validity of bilateral instruments between the United States and
Albania.
In view of the continued unwillingness of the present Albanian regime to
assume these bilateral commitments'and obligations, which are in no instance
of an onerous character and concern such customary subjects as arbitration
and conciliation, naturalization, extradition, and most-favored-nation treat-
ment (see the appended list), the United States' Government can no longer
serve any useful purpose by remaining in Albania. ...
Bilateral Treaties and Agreements between the United 'States and Albania
Arbitration treaty
Signed at Washington, Oct. 22, 1928. Ratifications exchanged Feb. 12,
1929; proclaimed Feb. 12, 1929. Effective Feb. 12, 1929.
Conciliation treaty
Signed at Washington, Oct. 22, 1928. Ratifications exchanged Feb. 12,
1929; proclaimed Feb, 12, 1929. Effective Feb. 12, 1929.
Naturalization treaty
Signed at Tirana, Apr. 5, 1932. Ratifications exchanged July 22, 1935:
proclaimed July 29, 1935. Effective July 22, 1935.
Extradition treaty
Signed at Tirana, Mar. I, 1933. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 14, 1935:
proclaimed Nov. 19, 1935. Effective Nov. 14, 1935.
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Agreement relating to most-favored-nation treatment and other matters.
Signed at Tirana, June 23"and 25, 1922. Effective July 28, 1922.
Agreement effected by exchange of notes for the waiver of passport visa fees
for non-immigrants.
Signed at Tirana, May 7, 1926. Effective June 1, 1926.
Money order convention.
Signed Apr. 13 and June 18, 1932. Effective July 1, 1933.
On November 14, 1946 a three-minute flag lowering ceremony took
place at the Department of State's survey mission in Tirana, and its
American staff drove off for Durres and, on November 15, ships carrying
the mission's American staff weighed anchor in heavy seas off this Alba-
nian port en route for Naples, arriving the next afternoon. Ironic sidelights
in connection with the hazardous boarding operation completed nearly ten
miles off Durres, despite ten-foot waves and minimal cooperation of Alba-
nian authorities, were a prior protest by the Albanian Government to the
United Nations charging the American mission with an improper request
for "two military craft," apparently UNRRA-owned but Albanian-
operated cargo lighters, for transferring freight from the docks to ships at
anchor, and subsequent claim of nearly $1,000 for the "loan" of the
UNRRA owned tug and lighter actually used in quitting Durres.
Noteworthy Developments (1955-1967) Following
Departure of American Survey Mission
A number of noteworthy developments have occurred since Prime Min-
ister Enver Hoxha in his New Year's Message of December 31, 1946
castigated the United States Government, and referred to the departure of
the American survey mission as good riddance.
On December 14, 1955, the People's Republic of Albania was admitted
to the United Nations, and, at the United Nations General Assembly's
60 1st Plenary Meeting of November 29, 1956, participated in the Assem-
bly's general debate for the first time. On that occasion Minister of Foreign
Affairs Behar Shtylla announced that on the basis of the five well-known
principles of peaceful coexistence, the People's Republic of Albania had
established diplomatic relations with twenty countries and was "ready and
willing to establish normal relations with every country desiring this."
At the 872nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, on September
28, 1960, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu, made the
invitation more specific:
We again confirm our readiness to establish normal relations with all States
which wish to have such relations with us, including the United States and
the United Kingdon.
Three years before addressing those conciliatory words to the United
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States and British Governments, Mehmet Shehu had received in Tirana the
enterprising foreign correspondent of The New York Times, Harrison E.
Salisbury. As the first American newspaperman to enter Albania in ten
years, Salisbury owed that honor to Mehmet Shehu himself. Despite this
small token of goodwill toward one individual, amplified obliquely to
include the United States itself in comments made by Mehmet Shehu,
reported by Mr. Salisbury in the series of articles he wrote to describe a
week's visit in Albania, officials of the Department of State were quoted in
The New York Times of September 13, 1957, as saying that there was "no
present prospect of any change in United States relations with Albania."
On March 16, 1967 it became less inappropriate for Americans to seek
to enter the People's Republic of Albania as far as the United States
Government was concerned. On that date the Department of State pub-
lished in the Federal Register a revision of Section 5 1.72 Passports invalid
for travel to restricted areas, of the Code of Federal Regulations. On the
same date, in the Federal Register, four public notices, Nos. 256-259,
emanating from the Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to the
authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 5 1.72,
were published. These public notices for United States citizens set forth a
restriction on travel to, in, or through Mainland China, Cuba, North Korea
and North Viet-Nam.
The restriction on travel to Albania was not published, indicating that
the Secretary of State had not determined, as he could have, that in
addition to the aforementioned restricted areas or countries, Albania was
now a "country or area to which travel must be restricted in the national
interest because such travel would seriously impair the conduct of U.S.
foreign affairs." Therefore, the restriction on travel to Albania is no longer
in effect as of March 16, 1967. However, this does not mean that the
United States Government is in a position to afford normal protection to its
citizens traveling there; it only means that United States passports no
longer need to be specially validated for travel to Albania.
"Study the Past" and "What is Past is Prologue"
On the Pennsylvania Avenue side of the National Archives Building in
Washington there are impressive statues, each bearing one of these in-
scriptions. It is evident from the within detailed account of diplomatic and
legal ramifications with respect to the policies of de jure recognition and
non-recognition, as applied by the United States Government to Albanian
Governments over the past fifty years, that the facts are now available
upon which to develop in 1972, a new and far more constructive policy
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toward the present Maoist-oriented Albanian Government still controlled
by those two comrades in arms of World War II-Colonel General Enver
Hoxha and Major General Mehmet Shehu.
One of the facts which can be documented in the files reposing in the
National Archives is the very close relationship between Albanians in the
United States of America, and their kinfolk in the southern part of Albania,
mainly in the prefectures along the Greek frontier. Although cut off from
their American kinfolk from 1939 to 1945, and again from 1946 to 1971,
they undoubtedly remain, as in June 1945, "highly pro-American" and
unaffected by anti-American propaganda.
A report on southern Albania based on personal observation, May
31-June 3, 1945, contained the sentence: "There are still hundreds of
people in the South who depend wholly on their husbands, parents, or
close friends in America." The truth of this statement can be seen in such
newspaper reports as the recent one entitled "Four Weeks in Albania," by
an Albanian American, Bill Gounaris. His personal account was serialized
throughout most of 1971 in Liria, one of the two Albanian-language weekly
newspapers published in Boston, the undisputed center of Albanian Ameri-
can activities in the United States.
The Gounaris account of his travels in southern Albania during his stay
in Albania from November 3 to December 1, 1970, provides current
support for the recommendation of July 1, 1945 made by Foreign Service
Officer Joseph Jacobs to the Secretary of State. Jacobs urged that, irrespec-
tive of recognition, communications between the United States and Al-
bania should be reopened for, according to his best estimates from the
vantage point of Tirana, "about 25% of Albania's population have either
been in US or have friends and relatives who have been there."
The Peking Precedent: From Confrontation to
Negotiation-An Historic First Step
Now that President Richard Nixon has made his historic journey to
Peking, the saying attributed to the Chinese that a long journey begins with
a single, first step should enjoy even more currency. From the day (Octo-
ber 26, 1970) when President Nixon in a toast to visiting President Nicolae
Ceausescu of Romania at the White House, deliberately used Peking's
official title-the People's Republic of China, the first time an American
President had ever done so, to the day of his arrival in Peking (February
20, 1972) is a long time, almost sixteen months.
Inasmuch as the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic
of Albania, through public expressions of mutual respect and joint assis-
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tance by their respective Party leaders, Chairman Mao and First Secretary
Enver Hoxha, e.g., in the exchange of telegrams between Peking and
Tirana dated September 9 and 17, 1968, within the context of an ever-
lasting and a "great and unbreakable militant friendship between the peo-
ples of China and Albania," do indeed form a sort of big and baby brother
combination, little (2 million population) Albania should not be overlooked
as a result of the awesome size of China (over 700 million population) and
the long distance from Peking to Tirana.
Moreover, President Nixon, in moving beyond the watershed year of
1971, has reasserted in his Third Annual Report on the State of United
States Foreign Policy dated February 1972, the continuing validity of the
American approach toward all potential adversaries as set forth in his
Inaugural Address of January 20, 1969, which contained these statements:
Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of commu-
nication will be open.
We seek an open world-open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and
people-a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isola-
tion.
If, when he spoke those lines, President Nixon did not have in mind,
besides the great People's Republic of China the small People's Republic
of Albania, he should be reminded of the statement he made July 15, 1971
to explain his Journey for Peace to Peking, in which he expressed the
conviction "that all nations will gain" from an improved relationship be-
tween the United States of America and the People's Republic of China.
Recommendations in Conclusion
It is respectfully submitted that the approach promised by President
Nixon in his .Inaugural Address contemplating entry now into an era of
negotiation has proved to be valid with respect to the People's Republic of
China. Accordingly, the approach should be pursued without delay with
respect to the People's Republic of Albania which, under the leadership
and control of Enver Hoxha, has engaged in continuous confrontation with
the United States of America for almost five years longer than the People's
Republic of China and as recently as the autumn of 1971 -when it spon-
sored the resolution for "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's
Republic of China in the United Nations."
Moreover, in view of the statesmanship he has exhibited by visiting two
crucially pivotal Balkan nations, one would hope that President Nixon will
seek and find an appropriate occasion, as with Ceausescu at the White
House, for deliberately using as President of the United States, Tirana's
official title-the People's Republic of Albania. From this new start we
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may find it possible to discard the sterile formula invariably utilized in
connection with the existing Albanian authorities, for almost three decades
and as recently as March 1971 in Secretary of State Rogers' detailed
report United States Foreign Policy 1969- 1970, to the effect that because
the Unided States does not recognize the Government of Albania it has no
diplomatic relations with it.
Postponement of the opening of official bilateral channels of commu-
nication between the two countries only serves to perpetuate errors and
shortcomings exhibited on both sides, in such matters as the diplomatic and
legal issues connected with the existing pre-war bilateral treaties and espe-
cially the bilateral agreements. Having written personal letters requesting
recognition to President Roosevelt (December 21, 1944) and President
Truman (July 25, 1945), which went unanswered, Enver Hoxha can with
some justification expect President Nixon to take the initiative in resuming
the dialogue.
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